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real-world distortions?
HARBIR LAMBA1
Abstract
In both finance and economics, quantitative models are usually studied
as isolated mathematical objects — most often defined by very strong sim-
plifying assumptions concerning rationality, efficiency and the existence of
disequilibrium adjustment mechanisms. This raises the important question
of how sensitive such models might be to real-world effects that violate the
assumptions.
We show how the consequences of rational behavior caused by perverse
incentives, as well as various irrational tendencies identified by behavioral
economists, can be systematically and consistently introduced into an agent-
based model for a financial asset. This generates a class of models which, in
the special case where such effects are absent, reduces to geometric Brow-
nian motion — the usual equilibrium pricing model. Thus we are able to
numerically perturb a widely-used equilibrium pricing model market and
investigate its stability.
The magnitude of such perturbations in real markets can be estimated
and the simulations imply that this is far outside the stability region of the
equilibrium solution, which is no longer observed. Indeed the price fluctu-
ations generated by endogenous dynamics, are in good general agreement
with the excess kurtosis and heteroskedasticity of actual asset prices.
The methodology is presented within the context of a financial market.
However, there are close links to concepts and theories from both micro- and
macro-economics including rational expectations, Soros’ theory of reflexiv-
ity, and Minsky’s theory of financial instability.
JEL Classification: C62; D01; D03; D53;
Keywords: Instability; Non-equilibrium dynamics
1 Introduction
All of the mainstream schools of economic thought and, in turn, modern finance
have been strongly motivated by the mathematical elegance and predictive success
1Department of Mathematical Sciences, George Mason University, MS 3F2, 4400 University
Drive, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
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of Newtonian mechanics and statistical physics. This has resulted in mathemati-
cal models constructed so that the solution is a unique, stable, equilibrium whose
value is both history-independent and a continuous function of the system vari-
ables.
The notion of equilibrium is close to being a unifying concept in modern eco-
nomics (see Setterfield (1997); Kaldor (1972)) although its precise meaning is
contextual. Here we shall take it to mean the absence (or complete cancellation)
of endogenous dynamics so that the state of the system is determined solely by
the current values of exogenous variables and not, say, on any prior state of the
system. This is certainly the case for gas molecules in a closed box that are react-
ing to slow changes in temperature — the pressure is determined by the Ideal Gas
Law and the current temperature. This happy state of affairs is guaranteed by the
Laws of Thermodynamics that provide both a unique statistical equilibrium and a
physical mechanism for reaching it.
One may speculate on what would happen if there was a special type of
molecule that did not obey the First and Second Laws of Thermodynamics (Con-
servation of Energy and Increasing Entropy respectively). These particles can
spontaneously speed up or slow down, reveal a temporary preference for one side
of the box over the other, or imitate the particles close to them. One may then
wonder which of these two types of molecule has more in common with agents in
an economic system.
Economic systems are aggregations of many heterogeneous agents and the
a priori requirement of history-independent equilibrium solutions has profound
consequences (see Kirman (1992)). Most models are generated by assuming that
agents display enough homogeneity to be ‘averaged’ or scaled-up and so replaced
by a representative agent who is memoryless and is both perfectly rational (usually
in the sense of maximizing some hypothetical utility function) and correct about
future expectations. This averaging procedure, when applied to expectations, is
known as the Rational Expectations Hypothesis and implies that while individual
agents’ expectations may be wrong they all use all available information and, on
average, agree with the expectations assumption being used with no systematic
deviations. 2
In this paper we shall consider a heterogeneous agent model of a financial
market to demonstrate that there are significant, systemic, real-world effects that
2Such averaging assumptions are the economic analogue of the Central Limit Theorem which
states that the average of independent random variables (from a distribution with finite mean and
variance) is normally distributed. The assumption of independence is crucial!
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cannot be removed by averaging once they reach a certain (rather low) level. This
is the point at which positive feedback mechanisms becomes strong enough to de-
feat the equilibrating process. Then the equilibrium market solution loses stability
completely and complex internal (endogenous) dynamics develop. This alters the
future evolution of the system in a history-dependent way that cannot be ade-
quately represented by any equilibrium model — although for much of that time
the system may easily be mistaken for one that is in equilibrium with an underly-
ing trend. Finally, the endogenous dynamics rapidly reverse in a cascade process.
The main source of positive feedback/instability (and non-averagability) in
the system is herding behavior whereby agents have some additional motivation
(ranging from completely irrational to hyper-rational) to prefer the position taken
by the majority of agents. While there are many possible causes of herding behav-
ior, the effects should usually be similar and can be modelled very simply using
the framework developed in Section 2.
Few would argue with the statement that irrational behavior and herding are a
common feature of the biggest market bubbles and crashes. Yet the question re-
mains as to how such factors may affect the workings of a market when, even with
the benefit of hindsight, no obvious mispricings are occurring. Two previous stud-
ies (Akerlof and Yellen (1985); Scharfstein and Stein (1990)) looked at the effects
of small changes to otherwise maximizing rational behavior. They both showed
that even small changes can cause significant (first order) changes to the value
of the equilibrium. The second study is particularly relevant in that it considered
rational herding by investment managers concerned about their relative perfor-
mance to be the primary source of the deviation. However these analyses were
performed within an equilibrium framework and so precluded the possibility of
non-equilibrium dynamic solutions. Similarly Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani
et al. (1992) introduced models of herd behavior via sequential decision-making
but again within an equilibrium framework.
The modelling framework to be described in Section 2 was introduced in
Lamba and Seaman (2008b) and Lamba (2010) and is based upon earlier related
models (Cross et al. (2005, 2006, 2007); Lamba and Seaman (2008b)). The pri-
mary motivation for this earlier work was to show how to incorporate various
systemic defects such as perverse incentives and investor psychology into an oth-
erwise efficient market and to establish a causal link between agent behavior at
the micro level and the non-Gaussian price statistics observed in financial mar-
kets. One clear conclusion was that herding can indeed induce ‘fat-tails’ consis-
tent with observed power-law decays of real asset price changes. Thus herding is
a possible, if not likely, contributor to an extremely important phenomenon that is
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inconsistent with standard financial models.
The motivation here is slightly different, although the modelling details are
similar. The model below should be considered a ‘stress-test’ of an extant equi-
librium pricing model that is carried out by weakening a particular subset of the
assumptions. It is important to note that this allows us to carry over, without any
detailed justification, those assumptions from the standard pricing model that are
not being weakened.
The paper is organized as follows. The modelling framework is described
fully in Section 2 together with an explanation of how various non-standard mo-
tivations, such as perverse incentives and the findings of behavioral economics,
can be approximated. Then in Section 3 the results of numerical simulations are
provided for realistic estimates of the model parameters. These demonstrate that
the qualitative and quantitative changes introduced by such ‘imperfections’ are
consistent with observations of real markets. In Section 4 various links are es-
tablished between the modelling philosophy with concepts and theories from eco-
nomics, finance, mathematics and physics. Section 5 contains the most significant
numerical results. Here the herding strength is used as a bifurcation parameter
to establish how much herding is required to destabilize the equilibrium market
solution. The answer would appear to be far lower than a plausible estimate of
herding in financial markets. Conclusions and suggestions for further research are
given in Section 6.
2 The Model
The simplest, and most common, asset pricing model assumes that the price p(t)
at time t obeys the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
d p = ap dt+bp dB (1)
where a and b are the constant drift and volatility of the price per unit time and B(t)
is a standard Brownian motion representing the arrival of uncorrelated Gaussian-
distributed information. Equation (1) is justified by positing that new information
is instantaneously and perfectly translated into a price change via some equili-
brating process. The solution to (1), found using the Itoˆ Calculus, is the geometric
Brownian motion
p(t) = p(0)exp
(
(a− 1
2
b2)t+bB(t)
)
. (2)
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The SDE (1) is highly unusual in that it has an explicit solution. Even more un-
usually, p(t) depends only upon the current value of B(t) and not the entire history
of the Brownian process up to that point. Thus the variable p(t) can be consid-
ered a paradigm for other variables in economic models that are assumed to be
the outcome of instantaneous equilibrating processes that are history-independent
(i.e. that have no memory).
Without loss of generality, we may choose a= 0 so that p(t) becomes the price
relative to the risk-free interest rate plus risk premium. We may also, by rescaling
time, choose b = 1 and then discretize time so that the solution at the end of the
nth time interval of length h is
p(n) = p(n−1)exp
(√
hη(n)−h/2
)
(3)
where η(n)∼N (0,1).
Note that the log-price P(n) = ln p(n) follows a standard Brownian motion
with the log-price changes ∆Pn = P(n)−P(n−1) having a Gaussian distribution
N (0,h). However this is in very poor agreement with reality. The ‘stylized facts’
of financial markets (see Mantegna and Stanley (2000); Cont (2001)) are a set of
statistical observations that appear to hold across all asset classes, independent
of geography, history and trading rules. There are two highly significant devia-
tions from (3). The first is the presence of ‘fat-tailed’ price returns whereby the
occurrence of the largest price changes (as measured over intervals of hours up
to months or years) follows an approximate power-law decay by contrast with
the exponential decay of Normal distributions. Thus the probability of the largest
price moves is underestimated by many orders of magnitude. The second phe-
nomena is volatility clustering, also known as heteroskedasticity, whereby large
price moves (in either direction) are more likely to occur shortly after other large
price moves. It is quantified by calculating the autocorrelation of the volatility
|P(n)−P(n−1)| which is again observed to follow a power-law decay. Under the
Normal approximation, this autocorrelation should be precisely zero.
Almost by definition, the price changes caused by the information stream are
effected by agents in the marketplace who a) act very fast and b) are motivated
by the arrival of new information η(n). The standard neoclassical argument is to
suppose that it is as if all agents are continuously, instantaneously and correctly
(on average) maximizing their respective utility functions. In reality the presence
of transaction costs and the immense computational effort will mean that trading
occurs over much longer timescales, at least for a subset of M agents. We shall
call them ‘slow agents’. We do not assume that slow agents are of uniform size
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(in terms of their trading positions) and thus weight the ith slow agent by her size
wi and define W = ∑Mi=1 wi.
Note that, in the standard pricing model (3), the market-clearing mechanism
is assumed to be efficient and thus the details are unimportant and not specified.
Similarly, only the slow agents will be explicitly simulated and it is assumed that
the fast agents provide sufficient liquidity3.
We now make some assumptions that, it must be emphasized, are not funda-
mental to the modelling philosophy. They keep the model simple and are suffi-
cient for the purpose at hand. Firstly, we assume that over the nth time interval
the ith slow agents can only be in one of two states, the state si(n) = +1 meaning
that she owns wi units of the asset, and the state si(n) = 0 meaning that she owns
none of the asset4. We can thus define the quantity σ(n) = 2W ∑
M
i=1 si(n)wi− 1
which is a linear measure of the aggregate demand of the slow agents. Note that
σ(n) =−1 when none of the slow agents own the asset and σ(n) = +1 when they
all do. Changes in σ are assumed to affect the log-price in a linear manner (via
the change in demand) modifying the discretized pricing formula (3) as follows
p(n) = p(n−1)exp
(√
hη(n)−h/2+κ∆σ(n)
)
(4)
where κ > 0 and ∆σ(n) = σ(n)−σ(n− 1). The parameter κ is a measure of the
total market depth of the slow agents.
At this point we note that (3) can be recovered from (4) in two different ways.
We can set κ = 0 so that there are no slow agents, or we can suppose that the
slow agents are also, on average, always correct and σ(n) = 0 ∀n. In either case
the models will generate the same price. However, the pricing formula (4) allows
for the possibility of endogenous dynamics amongst the slow agents affecting
the price p(n). Thus one can interpret (4) as stating that price changes have an
exogenous component
√
hη(n)−h/2 due to new information, and an endogenous
one, κ∆σ(n), caused by internal complex dynamics.
Finally, we introduce one further generalization of (3) by weakening the as-
sumption that the fast (information driven) agents must always perfectly translate
new information into price changes. This is achieved by adding a (for now unspec-
ified) function f (•) that modifies the effect on prices of new information entering
3The reader is directed to Lamba (2010) for a discussion of how the model can be modified at
times of severe market stress when liquidity cannot be assumed.
4In reality a slow agent may choose to gradually increase or decrease their holdings, short the
market, or buy derivatives, but this complicates the dynamics of the slow agents without providing
further insights.
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the market via
p(n) = p(n−1)exp
((√
hη(n)−h/2
)
f (•)+κ∆σ(n)
)
. (5)
with the fast agents acting perfectly if f ≡ 1.
Before continuing, the differences between the fast and slow agents should be
clarified, especially since only the slow ones will be simulated directly. In the
numerics that follow, h will be chosen to correspond to approximately 1/10 of a
trading day. Fast agents include institutions (or individuals) that regularly trade
the asset over a timescale of several days or less, and/or are motivated primarily
by new information. Slow traders on the other hand will typically shift investment
positions over weeks, months or longer.
Equation (5) does not yet constitute a closed system because no rules gov-
erning the switching of the slow agents between the 0 and +1 states have been
specified yet. There are many types of rule or trading strategy that could be
used, involving any desired combination of pure utility function maximization,
bonus/commission maximization, inductive learning, imitation among a network
of slow agents, technical trading, ‘gut instinct’, profits, losses, relative perfor-
mance of other investment options, market volatility, fear, greed, margin calls, the
weather, and so on ad nauseam. Prior studies such as the Santa Fe model (see
LeBaron et al. (1999)) do indeed use complicated ecosystems of trading strategies
and there is much to commend this approach.
We shall use an approach based upon moving price thresholds developed in
Lamba and Seaman (2008b) and Lamba (2010) which is deceptively simple but
capable of mimicking various real world influences, market ‘imperfections’ and
psychological biases (see Section 2.1). At the start of the nth time interval, the ith
slow agent is represented by its state, 0 or 1, and an evolving closed price interval
Ii(n) = [Li(n),Ui(n)] where Li(n)≤ p(t)≤Ui(t) (Figure 1). The endpoints Li and
Ui are referred to as the lower and upper thresholds respectively. If, at the end of
that time interval, the price has crossed either threshold5, agent i is deemed to be
no longer comfortable with her current investment position, switches states, and
the interval Ii is updated so that the price is again an interior point. Furthermore,
from (5) the action of switching causes a small jump in the log-price of 2κwi/W .
Each of the M slow agents has their own interval straddling the current price with
the price p and all of the thresholds evolving at each timestep.
5For example, an agent who is +1 may be switching to either take profits or cut losses depend-
ing on which threshold is breached. An agent who is 0 may be motivated either by a sell-off which
makes them think the stock is now cheap, or an urge to follow the momentum of a rising stock or
attempt to catch up with a benchmark.
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Price
state = +1
p(t)
L (t)j U (t)jL (t) U (t)i i
state = 0
Figure 1: A representation of the model showing two agents in opposite states.
Agent i is in the +1 state and is represented by the (interval between) the two
circles, and agent j is in the 0 state and is represented by the two crosses.
Since the intervals Ii are allowed to evolve, it just remains to define the dy-
namics of the Li and Ui. These thresholds for each agent will change (usually
slowly) between switchings and correspond to that agent’s evolving strategy. Or
equivalently the intervals can be thought of as their agents’ comfort zones within
which that agent is still satisfied with their current investment position. Note that
in the case of an algorithmic ‘black box’ or a hyper-rational utility maximizing
investor these thresholds will be consciously and explicitly known by that agent
but no other. A less-rational slow agent may not even be consciously aware of the
threshold values but will know when one of them is violated and act to switch.
The state of the equilibrium model (3) at any given moment is completely
specified by the current price (or equivalently the value of the information stream
B(t)). The situation for the full threshold model is very different. To specify the
current state of the system completely requires the additional knowledge of all
of the 2M threshold values and the rules specifying their dynamics. These en-
dogenous ‘hidden variables’ add a great deal of potential complexity to the model
but we shall make some simplifying assumptions that appear to be sufficient to
address the stability issues at hand.
In order to apply an averaging argument and preserve geometric Brownian
motion pricing (3), we suppose that there are myriad influences on slow agents’
strategies that can be adequately represented by different (and uncorrelated, in-
dependent) geometric Brownian motions applied directly to every agent’s thresh-
olds. These will be a mixture of purely rational independent analysis, completely
irrational thought processes, and mixtures of the two almost certainly in differing
proportions for each agent. Each of these influences will move each upper and
lower threshold either inwards or outwards, towards or away from, the current
price thus making the agent more or less likely to switch states respectively. Thus
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the threshold dynamics between switchings are given by
Li(n+1) = Li(n)+ p(n)N (0,hδi), Ui(n+1) =Ui(n)+ p(n)N (0,hδi). (6)
The quantity δi is the volatility of the threshold motion per unit time for the ith
agent. Finally, if an agent does in fact switch at the end of a time interval, their
threshold values will reset in such a way that is also independent of the other
agents. Thus, on average, equal numbers of slow agents will be switching at each
timestep and, provided that σ(0) = 0 with identical threshold distributions for the
agents in each state at time 0, σ remains close to 0 for all time resulting in the
standard equilibrium pricing model (3).
We have now, finally, reached the point where we can endogenously perturb
the price. To do this we need to include an influence on the slow agents that cannot
be averaged away. We posit that agents who are in the minority state (e.g. those
who are in state +1 if σ < 0) will, on average, have a motivation to switch and
join the majority. Furthermore the pressure to join the majority increases with the
magnitude of the difference between the two groups, measured by the quantity
|σ|. There are several effects that naturally lead to such a perturbation.
Firstly, any change in σwill lead to a drift in price that may be (mis)interpreted
as a fundamental trend with the minority agents reacting accordingly to the price
signal. Secondly, there may be ‘rational herding’ by investment managers who
find themselves chasing a benchmark average so as not to lose their jobs, bonuses
or investment capital 6(see Keynes (1936); Akerlof and Yellen (1985); Scharfstein
and Stein (1990)). A third cause is the actions of momentum investors who are
consciously trying to take detect a nascent bubble as part of their investment strat-
egy. Fourthly, there is the propensity of people, faced with uncertainty, to believe
that other people are better informed than they are, or their preference to risk fail-
ing conventionally than succeeding unconventionally (Keynes (1936)). Finally,
there may be purely psychological effects at work caused by the discomfort of
being in a minority, especially within social or professional networks. We shall
refer to all the above effects as causes of herding.
For simplicity we assume that each agent reacts to the current value of the
aggregate (excess) demand/sentiment, σ, although in reality agents will have dif-
ferent perceived values of this quantity (or may be be reacting, in part, subcon-
sciously). Herding is introduced into the model by supposing that for agents in
6These effects will be amplified by the short time-horizons of such evaluation periods.
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the minority position only (6) is replaced by
Li(n+1) = Li(n)+ p(n)(Cih|σ(n)|+N (0,hδi))
Ui(n+1) = Ui(n)− p(n)(Cih|σ(n)|+N (0,hδi)) (7)
while those in the majority remain unaffected. Note that the change is simply
to suppose that each minority agent has an inward threshold drift added to the
dynamics. Drifting the thresholds inwards (towards the current price of course)
reduces the time to the next switching and can be described as the agent’s com-
fort zone being ‘squeezed’ by the majority opinion. The rate of drift is taken to
be proportional to the length of the timestep, h, the magnitude of the imbalance
|σ(n)| and a constant Ci ≥ 0 quantifying the herding effect for that agent. Note
that herding is a positive-feedback effect — as σ moves away from 0 it, at least
initially, provides a mechanism for the imbalance to increase. This completes the
description of the model.
2.1 Justifications for moving thresholds
As mentioned above, once equation (5) has been reached one can in principle use
any modelling paradigm to specify the switching rules of the slow agents. Treating
each slow agent as a dynamic closed interval [Li,Ui] on the positive real line (that
must at all times contain the current price) is certainly unusual and at first may
seem highly unnatural. However the use of pairs of price thresholds offers some
compelling advantages.
Firstly there is the observation that slow agents react mostly to price changes
over longer time periods rather than the arrival of new information. Indeed invest-
ment advice and analysis is usually offered in the form of price triggers, as are the
outputs of computerized trading algorithms. Sometimes, such as in a margin call,
the agent has no choice over the pricing point.
A second important issue is that of transaction (or sunk) costs. These are often
neglected under simplifying assumptions but they profoundly change the nature of
agents’ behavior7. Even if one believes that agents are continuously maximizing
their utility functions this must somehow be translated into an acceptably small
number of trades since a continuous process of incremental adjustments would
be ruinous. Provided that switching results in new threshold values that are a
7It is amusing to note that many of the people who rely on such models are actually paid
from sunk costs. And all-too-often the possibility of significant transaction fees can skew the
information and research entering the market.
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non-zero distance away from the current price, then moving price thresholds are a
potential mechanism for converting one into the other. The existence of sunk costs
is closely linked to issues of hysteresis, memory-dependence and non-reversibility
that will be discussed further in Section 4.1.
Finally we turn to behavioral economics. It has already been shown how the
propensity for herding (rational and irrational) can be included by moving thresh-
olds inwards for agents in the minority position. However other effects such as
anchoring and loss-aversion can also be replicated. Anchoring is almost automatic
as thresholds are reset around the last trading price while loss aversion requires
slightly more complex rules involving keeping track of whether agents have made
a profit or a loss. An extreme, but unfortunately quite common, example demon-
strates the idea.
Imagine an individual who bought a dotcom stock at the height of the tech
bubble. Immediately the price goes down but, due to loss aversion which is the
emotional difficulty of acting to realize a loss, the lower threshold moves down
even faster. It is likely that the upper threshold is moving downwards too but
there is never enough of a temporary bounce in the stock price to cause a switch.
Eventually the stock price hits zero without the agent ever selling.
Recent work (see Kahneman and Tversky (1974); Rubinstein (1998); Gigeren-
zer (2002); Barberis and Thaler (2003); Earl et al. (2007)) has suggested plausible
heuristics that agents may be using in practice. It should be possible to recreate
such rules using moving thresholds and then observe the effects upon aggregate
statistics.
3 Preliminary Numerics
Detailed numerical investigations from a similar model (using two pairs of static
thresholds for each agent) are compared against the stylized facts in Lamba and
Seaman (2008a) and further numerical results for a moving threshold model can
be found in Lamba and Seaman (2008b). Here, for completeness, we provide
enough details for replication of the numerical results and sufficient simulations
to reveal the nature of the non-equilibrium solution. It must be emphasized that
no fine-tuning of parameters is required. Most of the parameters can be roughly
estimated and we do so conservatively and as simply as possible.
Firstly, we must choose a timestep h defined in units such that the variance
of the external information stream is unity for h = 1. An observed daily variance
in price returns of 0.6–0.7% suggests that h = 0.000004 should correspond to ap-
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proximately 1/10 of a trading day. The price changes of 10 consecutive timesteps
are then summed to give the daily price return.
We next assume that all slow agents have equal weight wi = 1. This could be
replaced by a Pareto distribution but we shall not do so here8. The behavior of
the system is largely independent of the number M of slow agents with M = 1000
being a lower-bound for representative simulations. All simulations in this paper
will use M = 100000 slow agents.
Next we fix how the slow agents’ thresholds are reset after a switching. If
agent i switches at a price p∗ then immediately afterwards the interval is reset to
[Li,Ui] = [p∗/(1+ZL), p∗(1+ZU)]
where ZL,ZU are each chosen from the uniform distribution on the interval [0.05,0.25].
This corresponds to an initial strategy that requires price ranges in the range 5–
25% before another switching (although of course the threshold dynamics will
alter the strategy as the system evolves).
We now turn to the most significant parameters, the herding parameters Ci for
each agent. Let us consider the more herding-susceptible agents and estimate that
they can be pressured to switch over a period less than a reporting quarter (about
80 trading days). This is certainly the case for fund managers who are trying to
keep up with a performance benchmark, or momentum investors, say, who try to
time the market several times a year. Then a simple calculation based upon (7)
suggests Cu = 100 as a reasonable upper bound for the herding parameters. Thus
we assign agents with a herding parameter chose uniformly from the uniform
distribution on [25,100] with the somewhat arbitrary but unimportant lower bound
corresponding to agents who are relatively immune to herding effects.
The parameters δi represent the ‘volatility’ of each agents strategy (or expec-
tations) and we simply assume they are all equal. Note that if δi = 1 then the
volatility of the thresholds is the same as the volatility in price due to the infor-
mation
√
hη entering the system in (5). This is probably too large since the slow
agents are not the ones motivated by new information and should alter their ex-
pectations more slowly. Thus we set δi = 0.2 ∀i.
Finally, as regards the slow agents, we come to the parameter κ that represents
the effect of aggregate slow demand upon the price in (5) but which is much
harder to estimate a priori. Simulations (not presented) show that even with κ= 0
endogenous dynamics and loss of equilibrium exist but without affecting the stock
8It is not necessary to assume that each slow agent corresponds to just one individual or insti-
tution — they could each refer to a subset of agents with very similar strategies or propensities.
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price at all. However if κ is too large the effect upon the price is so severe that the
resulting price fluctuations are unrealistically large. However for a surprisingly
wide range,κ ∈ [0.1,0.3], the price statistics are in good general agreement with
the stylized facts. We conservatively choose κ = 0.1 as our default value in the
simulations.
We now consider the fast agents. The function f (•) was introduced in (5) to
modify the effects of the fast agents by assuming that under certain circumstances
they do not accurately translate new information into price changes9.We shall sup-
pose that at times of extreme market sentiment, when σ is far away from 0, excess
speculation by fast traders occurs. This may be due to new agents entering the
market or by too much attention being paid to new information by traders expect-
ing a market correction. There is some evidence for this (see Brown (1999)) and
it also helps correct for the fact that in our simple model the slow agents are not
allowed to own multiple units of stock. As in previous work on this model the
simplistic but plausible choice f (•) = 1+α|σ| is made with α > 0. We choose
α = 1 so that at the most extreme mispricings, new information moves the mar-
ket twice as much as it would if the fast agents were correctly incorporating it.
It must be stressed that the presence of the function f (•) has no effect upon the
main conclusions of this paper and will be set to f ≡ 1 for one of the simulations
in Section 5 to demonstrate this.
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Figure 2: Asset price of a simulation over 40 years with 100000 agents.
9This is a simple but plausible mechanism for the generation of volatility clustering.
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Figure 2 shows a simulation with the above parameters. The initial states of
the agents and their thresholds are randomized. The thicker, more volatile curve
is the pricing output of (5) while the lighter curve is the output of the geometric
Brownian pricing model (that, recall, can be recovered by either setting κ = 0 or
all of the Ci = 0). A typical characteristic is that mispricings develop slowly and
then suddenly reverse. This can also seen in Figure 3 which plots σ against time.
Both parts of the mispricing sequence are caused by endogenous dynamics.
The incremental mispricing is due to herding effects. The sudden reversals occur
because eventually enough of the majority agents switch position to start a cascade
process — as agents switch they cause a change in price (due to the κ∆σ term
in (5)) that trips other agents’ thresholds and so on. Figure 4 shows the daily
percentage price returns. There are a significant number of large price changes
that cannot be explained by a Gaussian information stream and lie within the fat
tails10. For comparison, the price changes from the equilibrium model are shown
in Figure 5.
A snapshot of the internal structure of the market is shown in Figure 6. The
density of the lower and upper thresholds of each type of agent (0 and +1) are
plotted relative to the current price at a moment when σ ≈ 0 (the mismatch be-
tween the densities is far more severe when |σ| ≈ 1). The two density plots are
not identical (as they were in the initial state) meaning that as the system evolves
σ will once again move away from 0 because different numbers of agents will be
switching in either direction. The question that will be asked in Section 5 is: how
strong must the herding effect be to generate significant endogenous dynamics?
4 Links to economic concepts and extant models
4.1 Equilibria, memory and history-dependence
The notion of equilibrium described in the introduction is a very strong one, pre-
cluding the possibility of multiple internal configurations for the same external
parameters. Nonetheless the absence of (non-trivial) endogenous dynamics is a
prerequisite for models that are reversible and history-independent with tempo-
rary exogenous shocks having no permanent effect.
The key issue is one of memory at the micro-level. If individual agents have
no memory then it becomes much easier to assume that they will reverse their
10Interestingly there is a very close correspondence between the dynamics of these cascades
and Queueing Theory that is described in detail in Lamba (2010).
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Figure 3: A plot of σ against time for the simulation in Figure 2.
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Figure 4: Daily price returns for Figure 2.
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Figure 5: Daily price returns of the equilibrium price from Figure 2.
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actions and expectations when the external influence is removed. However eco-
nomic actors are subject to many effects (both rational and irrational) that cannot
reasonably be modelled in this way.
Perhaps the most significant of these rational factors is the ubiquitous pres-
ence of transaction (sunk) costs (see Dixit (1992); Piscitelli et al. (1999); Go¨cke
(2002)). These are expenses incurred that cannot be recouped on reversing the
action. As an example suppose that at the current widget price it is not profitable
for a manufacturer to have a factory produce the widget. However when the price
increases to β (perhaps due to a demand shock) the firm switches a factory over
to widget production from something else, incurring costs such as re-tooling and
factory down-time. If the price then falls back below β the factory will not imme-
diately switch out of production but rather waits until the price falls below some
value α. Thus if one only looks at the current price p and α < p < β it is not
possible to know what the factory is producing — one also needs to know which
of the threshold values α and β was last crossed.
In the physical sciences this is referred to as hysteresis11 and the reader is
directed to Cross et al. (2009) for a fuller description of the role of hysteresis
in economics. The presence of many such factories, all with differing threshold
values, results in many possible alternative internal configurations for the same
price level. Each of these possibilities results in a different future evolution of the
system which now displays both irreversibility and history-dependence12.
At an abstract level, the thresholds used to describe the slow agents in Sec-
tion 2 are a mechanism for introducing memory/history into the modelling pro-
cess (the fast agents, by assumption, act upon new information and require no such
mechanism). As an example, an agent who has been in the minority state for a
long time and is influenced by a herding pressure, on average will have thresholds
that are much closer together and be more likely to switch in the near future. This
information is propagated from one timestep to the next along with the agent’s
current state.
It is now worth revisiting the concept of equilibrium, allowing for the pos-
11In economics the term ‘hysteresis’ is often taken to mean the persistence of deviations from
equilibrium.
12When such effects are observed in macroeconomics a common equilibrium-based explanation
is the presence of a unit-root since, if a system is only marginally stable it will take a long time
to return to its former value after a disturbance. There are standard tests, under assumptions of
linearity and the absence of hysteresis, for determining if this might be the case (see Said and
Dickey (1984)). However marginal stability implies that a system is close to instability and this
should be far more worrying to economists than irreversibility.
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sibility of multiple endogenous configurations (and dynamics). Saying that the
market model simulation from Section 3 is in equilibrium until just before a sharp
reversal is akin to saying that a geological fault-line is in equilibrium until just
before the earthquake. This is true, in that there is a balance of both external
and internal forces, but the statement that the fault-line is in equilibrium just after
the earthquake is equally true. The ‘before’ and the ‘after’ can be approximated
deceptively well by unique equilibrium models, but not the transition!
The ‘balance of forces’ notion of equilibrium is not sufficient to guarantee
uniqueness and the system can rapidly move from one internal state to a different
one (with lower energy in the case of an earthquake). Finally, it should be noted
that multiple equilibrium models do exist in mainstream economics with the initial
conditions determining which equilibrium is achieved. However the situation here
is far worse — the set of feasible final states cannot be enumerated in advance and
depend on the path taken by the process.
4.2 Rational expectations and efficient markets
The philosophical, political, social and practical consequences of the mainstream
acceptance of the hypothesis of memory-free, efficient, financial markets cannot
be overstated. Although the concepts were introduced by Bachelier in his 1900
Ph.D. thesis, this work was largely forgotten until the 1960s when they became
known collectively as the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) (see Fama (1965);
Samuelson (1965); Fama (1970)).
The three versions of the EMH (weak, semi-strong and strong) all rely upon
two qualitatively different classes of assumption. Firstly, there are strong assump-
tions about the market itself and the nature of the information stream entering
it. Such information consists of, amongst other things, economic statistics, per-
formance reports, geopolitical events, and analysts projections. It is assumed to
be instantly available to all economic participants, uncorrelated with itself, and is
usually modeled as a Brownian motion, possibly with drift.
The second class of assumptions relates to the market participants themselves,
who are deemed to be perfectly rational, correctly incentivized, and capable of
instantaneously incorporating new data into their differing market strategies and
predictions. However, heterogeneity of agents (or their expectations) is necessary
to ensure that trading occurs in the absence of arbitrage opportunities. Thus the
final ingredient in the EMH description is the Rational Expectations Hypothe-
sis (REH) (see Muth (1961)) stating that the differing expectations driving trades,
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when used as predictions, are on average correct13 and do not result in market mis-
pricing. Additional assumptions, such as the absence of transaction costs, yield
the standard formulae used for risk management and derivative pricing which form
the bedrock of modern financial engineering (Black and Scholes (1973)). It is this
second class of assumptions that are the focus of this paper.
As described in Section 2, if one sets f (•)≡ 1, Ci = 0 ∀i and further assumes
that all threshold dynamics for the slow agents are the result of perfectly rational,
independent, utility maximizing behavior (satisfying the REH) then one recovers
an equilibrium market following geometric Brownian motion and satisfying the
EMH. Once one weakens these assumptions to allow for more general dynamics
(and motivations), the moving threshold model can be thought of as a ‘perturba-
tion space’ within which one can explore the robustness/stability of the default
EMH model.
Even if agents are not perfectly rational and other factors influence the thresh-
old dynamics, the pricing should remain correct provided that the REH still holds.
However the presence of just one REH-violating perturbation potentially invali-
dates its use. As was shown in the numerical simulation of Section 3, real-world
effects that induce herding do exactly that, giving rise to price dynamics that differ
greatly (qualitatively and quantitatively) from the equilibrium model by introduc-
ing a form of coupling between agents’ actions. However it is possible that lower
levels of herding may result in acceptably small deviations from equilibrium. In
Section 5 the herding parameter will be systematically varied to show that this
does appear to be the case, although only if the herding parameter is reduced by a
significant factor from its estimated real-world value.
Even markets in which irrationality exists can be ‘efficient’ in the sense that
investors cannot earn above-average returns without taking on above-average risk.
Indeed, this is a minimal requirement for any predictive market model (see Malkiel
(2003))14. In Cross et al. (2007) it was shown that there is no statistically signif-
icant different between the the investment performance of agents with differing
herding propensities Ci (and hence nothing to be gained by adaptively changing
their reaction to herding). Indeed when transaction costs are taken into account the
traders with the highest values of Ci, that includes momentum traders, performed
significantly worse, in agreement with previous studies (Odean (1999)).
One potential criticism of the model is that the fast agents are assumed to be
13As opposed to being consistent with the modelling assumptions which is the form of the REH
most often used in macroeconomic modelling.
14The aim of this work is not to show that irrational markets are inefficient, rather that equilib-
rium models are fundamentally inadequate.
19
reacting to new information and converting it into price changes. However there
may also exist true fundamental fast agents who are aware of the current non-zero
value of σ and the correct price and who view this as an arbitrage opportunity. This
would act as an additional equilibrating (negative-feedback) mechanism helping
to counteract the herding. This brings us to the very important issue of the limits
of arbitrage, both in the model and in real markets.
Firstly, as regards the model, σ is assumed to be precisely known by all the
slow agents. This is purely for simplicity and agents may have widely-differing
perceived values that are only approximately (or on average) correct. Also, it is
important to note that no agents are assumed to know the correct gemetric Brow-
nian motion price. It is calculated and plotted in Section 3 but this is only a visual
aid — none of the agents need to be made aware of it. As it stands the model is a
caricature, albeit one that can be made arbitrarily more complicated and realistic.
As this complexity grows, any potential model-specific opportunities for arbitrage
that might exist will reduce and so now we discuss the limits to arbitrage in real
markets.
Arbitrageurs and/or fundamentalist investors provide a possible to counteract
herding effects. However there are severe limitations in practice. Firstly there is
the noise-trader problem (see Schleifer (2000) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997))
— arbitrageurs typically have very short time-horizons and mispricings can last
a very long time. Secondly there is the existence of speculative traders and short
term momentum-traders who may actually make the mispricing worse. Thirdly, it
is difficult in pactice to be sure what the fundamental price actually is. There is no
visible, unambiguous, information stream and all trends may be misinterpreted as
rational — especially by those who subscribe to the EMH! Some evidence for this
may be found in the wide variations over time of even the most basic measures of
value such as the P/E ratio of a stock.
This is not to dismiss entirely the possibility that herding effects can be coun-
teracted. Indeed many, perhaps even the vast majority of, potential bubbles may
get deflated before anyone even noticed by rational agents working as the EMH
suggests they should. The point is that it does not happen every time. The stability
results to be presented in Section 5 should, in this light, be viewed as a preliminary
attempt to quantify which effect eventually wins.
4.3 Technical analysis
Given the widespread belief in the underlying notion of (at least weakly) efficient
markets, a surprisingly large number of people are employed in technical analysis,
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looking for exploitable trends and patterns in past pricing/volume data. Some
studies, such as Brock et al. (1992), claim that the most popular trading rules
(based upon moving averages and support/resistance levels) can indeed produce
statistically significant profits, even in the presence of transaction costs, while
others dispute this (see Chan et al. (1996) and Malkiel (2003)).
An obvious question to ask is what effect such technical traders might have
on the market, if any. A second question is, if a particular technical trading rule
does indeed work, what are the reasons for it? It may be caused by the presence
of one or more systemic defects (such as herding effects, perverse incentives, or
behavioral effects) or it may in fact be a self-fulfilling prophesy caused by the
large numbers of technical traders using that rule themselves. By incorporating
such strategies into the threshold dynamics, it is possible to systematically explore
such questions. Preliminary results will be presented elsewhere.
4.4 Soros’ Theory of Reflexivity
In Soros (2003, 2008), George Soros introduced his Theory of Reflexivity. While
this is still at the stage of being a philosophical theory, and as yet has had little
impact on economics or finance, its relationship to the modelling approach used
here (and between its predictions and the numerical results presented above) is
close enough to merit comment.
Soros’ theory rests upon two observations. Firstly, human beings are fallible
and they may misinterpret an apparent trend, or some fundamental misconception
may take hold. This results in investor behavior that is incorrect but in turn induces
changes to the market or economic system. Positive feedback effects then cause
an increasing mismatch between perception/prices and economic fundamentals
that eventually becomes unsustainable and rapidly unwinds.
In the model of Section 2, herding provides the amplification mechanism. This
is reflexive in the sense that beliefs affect prices, provided κ > 0 in (5). Soros
suggests that such processes are commonplace in economic systems and result in
far-from-equilibrium dynamics that only become apparent at the very end. This is
exactly what is observed in the simulations from Section 3.
4.5 Minsky and the financial instability hypothesis
Recent events in financial markets have re-awakened interest in the work of Hy-
man Minsky and in particular his theory of financial instability (Minsky (1992,
2008)). Minsky’s work is unusual in macroeconomics in that it places a great deal
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of importance upon the role of the financial system and debt accumulation. He
also stressed, following on from Keynes (1921), the role played by market senti-
ment (analogous to the quantity σ above), belief under uncertainty, systemic risks
and contagion.
Minsky argued that a rising trend in prices (for whatever cause) during a pe-
riod of relative stability will attract savings and profits leading to further price
rises. Gradually there is a reduction in the perceived level of risk that encourages
more lending, debt and leverage. Lending standards fall, risk-taking increases,
and ‘Ponzi borrowers’ appear who are relying upon increasing prices to service
their debt. Eventually the system becomes unstable, credit tightens, and prices
cascade downwards in a ‘Minsky moment’.
Minsky believed that such processes were the norm rather than the exception
with disequilibrium adjustment mechanisms being insufficient to counteract or
prevent them. The resulting dynamics are similar to those observed in the nu-
merics of Section 3 — there is a long period of apparent trend stability at the
aggregate level (whose magnitude and duration are extremely hard to predict) that
masks increasing endogenous instability. Then when the process ends it does so
very rapidly. Or to put it another way, similar positions develop gradually and
then unwind quickly.
There are two ways in which the model presented here relates to the work
of Minsky. Firstly, the increasing availability of low-quality credit and lowered
perception of risk provide yet another herding mechanism that adds ‘fuel to the
fire’. Secondly, if one reinterprets the price p(n) in the model of Section 2 as
being a quantity that represents the overall level of, and ease of obtaining, credit
(with slow agents being potential lenders) then one has a model that is distinctly
Minskian. A more sophisticated model might couple together two such models,
one for price and one for credit15.
5 Stability simulations — how much herding is too
much?
In the numerics of Section 3 the herding parameters Ci for the slow agents were
chosen from the uniform distribution on [25,100]. However we know that if all
the Ci are set to 0 then the equilibrium solution is recovered. We now investi-
15It should be pointed out the model in this paper is symmetric with respect to rising and falling
prices, while Minsky’s arguments are not. This is not a fundamental problem, however.
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gate the manner in which the equilibrium solution loses stability as the herding is
systematically increased from 0.
We introduce a bifurcation parameter Cmax and choose all the Ci uniformly
from the interval [Cmax/4,Cmax]. In order to quantify the level of disequilibrium
in the system we record the maximum value of |σ| over the last 30 years of the
simulation (to remove any possible transient effects caused by the initial condi-
tions).
Figure 7 shows the results (with the maximum of |σ| averaged over 10 runs)
with all other parameters kept unchanged from those used to generate Figure 1 —
the only difference is that the initial value of σ is set to 0.05 to provide an initial
disturbance to the system.
As can be seen, the equilibrium solution can be considered a good approx-
imation only for Cmax < 10 which is an order of magnitude below our (rather
conservative) estimate Cmax = 100 from Section 3. The loss of stability, measured
in terms of the maximum deviation of σ from 0, is gradual and saturates at around
Cmax = 60.
A rough description of the dynamics of the system is as follows. The drift in
the threshold dynamics of the minority agents is a destabilizing influence, while
the diffusion of the thresholds and the fact that the majority agents do of course
eventually switch out of their position are stabilizing influences. The existence of
such competing forces is a very common cause of non-trivial dynamics in com-
plex nonlinear systems. A mathematical treatment of these stability issues will be
presented elsewhere.
It could be argued that the presence of α 6= 0 modifies the influence of the
fast agents and may be in part responsible for the loss of equilibrium stability.
This is ruled out by Figure 8 which shows the results with α = 0. If anything
the instability is more pronounced with the full extent of far-from-equilibrium
dynamics being reached at Cmax ≈ 40.
Finally, we consider the parameters δi that govern the diffusion of slow agent
thresholds. In Section 3 it was argued that this would likely be lower than the
price volatility and so was set to δi = 0.2 ∀i. Figure 9 sets δi = 1 ∀i so that the
magnitudes are now comparable. The change from Figure 7 is negligible.
6 Conclusions
The numerical results of Section 5 demonstrate that a hypothetical, yet recogniz-
able, equilibrium market model loses stability in the presence of even relatively
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Figure 7: A plot showing the degree of disequilibrium |σ|max averaged over 10
runs for varying levels of the herding parameter Cmax.
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Figure 8: The same plot as 7 but with α = 0 implying that the fast agents are
perfectly translating new information into price changes.
25
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 0  20  40  60  80  100
 
σ
m
a
x
 Cmax
Figure 9: The threshold dynamics are made more volatile by increasing δ to 1.
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small herding pressures — whatever their underlying cause may be. Or to put
it another way, the positive feedback mechanisms caused by herding effects can
overwhelm self-correcting equilibrium models. This does not by itself prove that
such an instability occurs in any actual market, but there are two observations
that suggest this is the case. Firstly, the price statistics of the unstable system are
much closer to the stylized facts of financial markets than those of the equilibrium
model. Secondly, while the model itself is quantitative and new, it shares features
with qualitative and long-standing critiques of equilibrium models and neoclassi-
cal economics. Hopefully the work presented here will make a useful contribution
to the debate.
Suppose for a moment that herding is indeed responsible for moving markets
away from equilibrium. This has important policy implications (apart from the de-
sirable reduction in overall leverage that is an obvious remedy for underestimating
the risk from fat-tail events). The global financial crisis that finally became appar-
ent to everyone in 2007/8 appears to have been, at least in part, caused by the in-
creased attention to short timescales caused by, for example, fund-managers chas-
ing the average every quarter, individuals trying to flip houses, and inappropriate
short-term performance-related bonuses and upfront commissions being paid out
throughout the financial system16. Regulations to increase the time horizon of fi-
nancial actors would reduce the herding pressure and indeed at the time of writing
such proposals are being either discussed or enacted in the US and the UK.
The mathematical description of the threshold dynamics lies within a new
class of stochastic partial differential equations for which closed-form analytic so-
lutions almost certainly do not exist. This may be unacceptable to many economists.
However, the value of such models (and solutions) in almost every other quantita-
tive discipline is beyond dispute and there is no compelling reason to suppose that
economic systems should be an exception. For example, chaos theory has shown
that even very simple dynamical systems, evolving without any external influ-
ences, can be inherently unpredictable (except possibly in a statistical sense). Yet,
even in the absence of explicit solutions, chaos theory is still capable of quanti-
fying both the probabilities of events and the theoretical time limit on meaningful
predictions.
Finally, it is worth stepping back to look abstractly at the process leading from
(3) to the full moving threshold model. This started with the transition from an
equilibrium model that implicitly relies upon averaging and a representative agent
16This general question of how complex systems with no natural timescale react to forces with
an artificial time horizon may also be useful in other fields such as ecology.
27
to a bigger system that explicitly allows for the possibility of endogenous dynam-
ics. But, if the rules governing the agents’ dynamics are assumed to be uncor-
related and independent then the aggregate behavior of the system is unchanged.
Then more complicated dynamics for individual agents can be introduced that
correspond to the effect under investigation and can be regarded as perturbations
to the equilibrium model17. Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
models may provide an interesting starting point for a similar procedure as they
also rely heavily upon the use of averaging, representative agents and equilibrium
theory. Furthermore, the new-Keynesian DSGE models incorporate the concept
of ‘sticky prices’ which suggests that the use of thresholds may again be a suitable
way to introduce non-standard effects within them.
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